IN THIS final article in the trilogy, I will examine some possible lessons from the war so far. To begin with the Russian military: it clearly has some major issues to address around its doctrine, training, logistics, the integration of all arms and the co-operation of ground forces with air – the Russian Air Force has been far from the overwhelmingly dominant force that might have been expected. Bombardment, as we have already noticed, has papered over the cracks to date, but that would not suffice in a major conflict in which the US Air Force owned the skies. Solving these issues must, therefore, be a major implication for the Russian armed forces. We must expect that they will already be carrying out a ‘lessons-learned’ process, the outcome of which we will not see for a while since lessons are learned only when they result in changes to doctrine, practice or equipment; until then they are merely identified.
#Ukraine: Late last month, the Ukrainian 6th Separate Rifle Battalion destroyed a Russian BMP IFV and a T72B-series tank in the vicinity of Novoselovka Vtoraya, #Donetsk Oblast. pic.twitter.com/hehBpc00Go
— 🇺🇦 Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) December 8, 2022
